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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffRespondent .
Case No. 14485

vs.
FARHAD SOROUSHIRIN,
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Distribution, Not For Value,
Of A Controlled Substance, to-wit: Marijuana, a felony, and commitment to
the Utah State Division of Corrections for a period of not to exceed ninety
(90) days, pursuant to Section 76-3-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as •
amended.

(R. 59) The case was tried before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist,

sitting without a jury.

From the conviction and the commitment defendant-

appellant appeals.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged by information with the crime of Distribution
For Value Of A Controlled Substance, to-wit: Marijuana, in violation of
Sec. 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Anno. 1953, as amended.

(R.6) At

arraignment the trial court rejected appellant's plea of once in jeopardy
and denied his motion to dismiss on ground of:

(1) Entrapment,

(2) Double jeopardy, and (3) Denial of a speedy trial.

(R.9-10 and R.23-30)
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Appellant's not guilty plea was entered and the matter set for trial.
Defendant was unable to locate a key witness (R.14, 34) and
on the date set for trial, moved the court for an order compelling the
State to produce the witness.

(Tr.3) Appellant's motion was denied and

the case was heard by the trial judge sitting without jury.
The trial judge found appellant "not guilty of the major
offense...because of entrapment". He then found the defendant guilty of
the "lesser offense" of "Distributing Not For Value". (Tr.103)
Appellant moved for a judgment of acquital. (R.40-48) After
the hearing the court denied the motion and committed appellant to the
custody of the Division of Corrections for a period of ninety (90) days
for evaluation prior to sentencing. (R.59)
Notice of appeal was filed (R.50) and the trial judge issued
a Certificate of Probable Cause and Order Admitting Defendant to Bail
Pending Appeal. (R.51,52)
Vi>

---*-'' -• RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

:

l

Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and/or a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September of 1974, Ogden Police Officer L. J. Call was
assigned to Weber State College as an "under cover agent".(Tr.46) He was
provided a room in a college dormitory and enrolled in four classes by the
Weber State College Security Office, (Tr.68) The class enrollment was a
"front" to hide his investigations of certain professors at the college.
(Tr.47,48)
The officer characterized his duties as follows: "My duty was
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to find some individual and get him to sell me some type of narcotics,
then we would make a complaint against him." (Tr.48)
He describes his mode of operation as follows:

"I would just roam the

streets, sit in cafes, sit in the temple grounds, make friends, and when I
felt it was time, I would ask them if they had any marijuana to purchase or
knew of anyone who could sell me some." (Tr.35)
He "befriended" a young black student named Terrell Eady and led him
to believe he was his close friend. (Tr.M-M-) The officer engineered a number
of "pot" parties with Mr. Eady. At least one party was in the officer's
dormitory apartment and others were in the officerTs automobile.(Tr.M-5)
On October 29, 197*4, Officer Call and Mr. Eady discussed getting some
marijuana. Mr. Eady said he "knew some individuals who would have some."
Officer Call drove him to three or four homes but they were unable to find
anyone who could or would sell them anything. (Tr.41)
Finally the officer testified, Mr. Eady indicated "He knew a Persian
up on Harrison who possibly could have some or know someone who would have
some marijuana."

Officer Call drove Mr. Eady to the Eastridge Apartments

where defendant lived. Mr. Eady went alone to the apartment and Officer
Call remained in his automobile. (Tr.42)
Mr. Eady returned with Mr. Soroushirn, the appellant, and made introductions.

Officer Call stated that he could recall no conversation with

Mr. Soroushirn including any form of instruction as to where to go or how
to get there. (Tr.66) Apparently Mr. Eady took the initiative and told the
officer what had to be done. (Tr.43) The officer then drove Messrs. Eady
and Soroushirn to an address on 26th Street. There the officer gave appellant $20 and told him to get two bags of marijuana. Mr. Soroushirn left
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the vehicle and went alone into an apartment building and x^eturned with the
marijuana.

Later Officer Call drove Mr. Soroushirn back to his apartment

and testified he gave him a "couple of joints" for his efforts. (Tr,60-61)
Throughout the following week, Officer Call made repeated visits to
Mr. SoroushirnTs apartment, for the purpose of inducing appellant to buy
marijuana from his "contact." (Tr.65) He stated, ,!,,.I went there a number
of times and sometimes he was there and sometimes he wasn1:t<" Each time the
officer contacted the appellant, he asked, "Can you get me some or can your
contact get me some?" (Tr,52)
On each of these occasions, the officer's attempts were rebuffed and he saw
nothing to indicate that appellant had any personal supply of marijuana or that
he was engaged in selling the same. (Tr.53) On November 5, 1974, the officer
went again to Mr. Soroushirn!s apartment and tT.. .asked him if his contact had
any marijuana."

Appellant finished dressing and accompanied him to the same

address on 26th Street they had gone to eight days earlier. (Tr.37)
The officer gave appellant two twenty-dollar bills and asked for four
bags of marijuana. Appellant went into the apartment and returned with the
marijuana. (Tr.37,38) Officer Call returned appellant to his apartment
where, according to the officer1s statement, appellant rolled and kept two
joints.

(Tr.39)

Mr. Sorourshirn was first prosecuted for the events which occurred on
October 29, 1974. Following preliminary hearing and arraignment in District
Court, he filed a motion for dismissal on grounds of "Entrapment". The
hearing was held on May 21, 1975. At the hearing Mr. Terrell Eady testified.
The court took the entrapment motion under advisement and set the matter for
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trial on May 29, 1975. (Tr.83) The trial date was set at the appellant's
request to assure Mr. EadyTs availability to testify before his departure
from the area after the school term was completed. (Tr.51,84)
On May 22, 1975, the day after the entrapment hearing on the first
prosecution, Officer Call was summoned to the county attorney's office and
told to sign a second complaint against the appellant. The complaint was
to cover the second purchase which had occurred November 5, 1974. (Tr.50)
The prosecutor then called appellant's attorney and advised him that
".. .the case would be dismissed on the date of the trial and that your
client wouldn't have to appear.1' (Tr.94)
No mention was made of the second complaint and neither legal counsel,
appellant, or Mr. Eady had any notice that a second prosecution was contemplated when the prosecutor appeared with defense counsel on May 28, 1975,
and dismissed the first prosecution "with prejudice." (Tr.93)
After the second complaint was signed on May 22, 1975, the prosecutor
did not seek an arrest warrant or issue a summons. (Tr.86) Approximately
six weeks later the warrant was issued and Mr. Soroushirn was arrested and
forced to post a fifteen hundred dollar bail. (R.2)
At arraignment in district court, on the second prosecution, appellant
moved to dismiss, raising the defenses of: (1) entrapment, (2) double
jeopardy, and (3) denial of speedy trial. (R.9-10) Hearing on the motion
was set for October 1, 1975.

f

Appellant sought to subpoena Terrell Eady on the issue of entrapment,
but the subpoena was returned unserved with a notation by Lt. Price of the
Weber County Sheriff's Department that Mr. Eady was in Florida, (R.1U)
The State was given notice at that time of the need for Mr. Eady's testi-
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mony at trial, (Motion to Dismiss, Tr,2)
The case was set for trial on January 27,1976,

Appellant appeared

and moved the court for an order compelling the State to produce Terrell
Eady as a key witness for appellant. (Tr,3)

The court denied the motion

and ordered the case to trial. (Tr.ll)
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge, sitting without a jury,
found the appellant "nox guilty of the major offense,,.because of entrap^
ment."

However, he found appellant guilty of the tTlesser offense?T of

"Distributing Not For Value", asserting that entrapment "in this case" is
only a "partial defense." (Tr.103)

POINT I

,

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN HOLDING ENTRAPMENT IS ONLY A PARTIAL DEFENSE
Appellant was charged and stood trial for the offense of "Distributing
For Value a Controlled Substance, to-wit: Marijuana, a felony." (R.1,6)
The trial judge found the appellant "not guilty of the major offense...
because of entrapment."

The judge then found appellant "guilty" of a

"lesser offense of Distributing Not For Value", also a felony, asserting that
entrapment "in this case" is only a "partial defense." (Tr.103)
The Utah Legislature has established "entrapment" as a complete defense
to criminal responsibility and provides "should the court determine that
the defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice..."
76-2-303, U.C.A., 1953 as amended.

Having found that entrapment occured as

to the offense tried, the court was bound to dismiss the prosecution with
prejudice.

It was not at liberty to substitute a new felony charge and enter

a finding of guilt without notice or hearing.
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Even without the testimony of Mr. Eady, it is hard to conceive of a
nore patent case of entrapment than the one now before this Court. The
evidence shows that the Ogden City Police and Weber State College Security
Office embarked on a crusade to expose criminal activities at the college
in the Fall of 1974. (Tr.68)
The plan was ill-conceived and poorly implemented from the outset.
L. J. Call, an undercover agent, was placed in the college dormitory and
enrolled in classes for the purpose of investigating the professors.
(Tr.48) When assigned to Weber State College, he had approximately one
monthTs experience on the force. (Tr.46) He had difficulty conceptualizing
his duties and responsibilities. He testified his duty was "...to find some
individual and get him to sell me some type of narcotics, then we would
make a complaint against him." (Tr.48)
He was generously endowed with taxpayers' money which he freely expended
on "pot parties" in his dormitory and automobile and while roaming the
streets, cafes and temple grounds, trying to "make friends" so that he could
ask them if they had any marijuana to purchase or knew of anyone who would
sell to him.

His supervisor testified that the amount of money funnelled

through the officer to purchase marijuana during his brief stay at the
college "would probably" be less than $1,000.00. (Tr.75)
After "befriending" a young black student named Terrell Eady and
juicing him up with pot parties (Tr.45), he undertook to chauffeur Mr.
Eady around town for the purpose of soliciting marijuana purchases from his
friends. The officer testified that prior to calling on Mr. Soroushirn
they had indiscriminately solicited four or five of Mr. Eadyfs friends with
negative results. (Tr.41) He knew the identities of none of those solicited including appellant and had no reason to believe any were engaged
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in sale or use of marijuana. (Tr.44)
Criminal investigations of this sort tend to be self-defeating.

Such

police conduct increases criminal activity or introduces it where it did not
exist earlier. The emergence of public funds to buy marijuana could and did
act as a magnet to draw marijuana to the college. Courts and lawmakers have
sought to curb such excesses through a number of avenues, including codification of the defense of entrapment. Utah law provides:
"Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or person
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces
the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one
not otherwise ready to commit it." Sec.76-2-303, U.C.A. 1953,
as amended.
In making entrapment a complete defense to criminal responsibility and
providing "Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it
shall dismiss the case with prejudice...", the Legislature left no doubt
as to the legal significance of entrapment. Having found entrapment as to
the facts before it in this case, the trial court had no discretion but was
bound to dismiss the prosecution with prejudice. The trial judge erred by
substituting charges and entering a finding of guilt without notice or
hearing on the "lesser offense."

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT >S PLEA OF FORMER
JEOPARDY
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "once in jeopardy" and
asked the court to dismiss this action. (R.9-10, 23-29) The motion was
denied. (R.30)
On two occasions, October 29, 1974, and November 5, 1974, Officer L. J.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Call obtained Mr. Soroushirn?s assistance in purchasing marijuana. During
the period between these two dates the officer made several unsuccessful
attempts to buy through appellant.

(Tr.52-54)

The County Attorney treated the two incidents as separate offenses
and immediately prosecuted appellant for the incident that occurred on
October 29, 1974. The Chief Criminal Deputy advised the court that it was
an established policy in ndrug cases" to file one case and have other
"holding cases" that can be used for "either negotiating purposes or for
other reasons". (Motion to Dismiss, Tr.20)
After arraignment in District Court on the first charge appellant
raised the defense of entrapment. A hearing was held and the prosecutor
heard the testimony of Mr. Terrell Eady on the question of entrapment. -Mr.
Eady had introduced Officer Call to appellant and appeared to direct matters
as to how the purchase was effected.

CTr.43,-6)

The entrapment hearing was held May 21, 1975, while Mr. Eady was engaged
in final exams at Weber State College. He advised the court of his plans to
leave Utah after the end of the school term.

The entrapment issue was taken

under advisement and the trial was set for May 29, 1975, to assure Mr.
EadyTs availability in event the matter went to trial. (Tr.51,84)
The prosecutor acknowledged that Mr. Eady was a "good witness" (Tr.97)
and that "there might be a finding of not guilty in that case." He went on
to state "We feared that he might be completely exonerated of the first case
and the evidence should not be brought up."

(Tr. 87)

Following the entrapment hearing the prosecution developed a new trial
stratagy. A second complaint citing the incident that occurred on November
5, 1974, the second of the two alleged marijuana purchases, was obtained.
The complaint was signed on May 22, 1975, the day after the entrapment
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hearing on the first prosecution and six and one-half months after the alleged
incident.

-.

The prosecutor then called Mr. Soroushirin1 s attorney and told him he
would dismiss the first prosecution and not to prepare for trial. He advised
counsel that appellant need not appear. (Tr. 94)
No warrant or summons was issued regarding the second case and no notice
of its existence was given until appellant1s arrest on July 7, 1975, eight
months after the incident and six weeks after Mr. EadyTs planned departure
from the state. (Tr. 86, 93)
The prosecutor knew that Mr. Eady was on court-imposed probation and
could be located through his probation officer. (Tr. 89-90) However, he
offered no assistance or information to appellant even though he knew of
appellant's many attempts to locate the witness. (R.14-, R.34, Motion to
Dismiss, Tr.2)
The State is estopped from prosecuting this action under the doctrine
of Collateral Estoppel as .outlined in Ash v. Swensen, 397 U.S. 4-36, 25 L.Ed.
469, 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970). Collateral Estoppel is applied when an issue of
ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment to assure
that the issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any
future lawsuit.

In Ash, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the princi-

ples of Collateral Estoppel are embodied in the Fifth Amendment's guarantee
against double jeopardy and is thus binding on state prosecutions.
Ash involved an armed robbery of six poker players. The accused was
tried and acquitted of robbing one of the players. The State then tried and
convicted him of robbing another of the players.

In reversing the conviction

the Supreme Court noted that where there has been a prior acquittal at court
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should:
"...examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the
pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude
whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue
other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. The inquiry 'must be set in a practical frame and viewed with
an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedingsr. "
In applying this standard the Supreme Court looked to the facts in
each robbery prosecution and decided,
"...the record is utterly devoid of any indication that the first
jury could rationally have found that an armed robbery had not
occurred, or that Knight had not been a victim of that robbery.
The single rationally conceived issue in dispute before the jury was
whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers. And the jury by
its verdict found that he had not...therefore, a second prosecution
for the robbery of Roberts is wholly impermissible." 397 U.S. 445
In the case at bar the only issue raised as to either prosecution was
entrapment. Where there are multiple purchases of a controlled substance
from a defendant by the same officer as part of a single investigation the
court must look to the initial inducement to determine the existence or
non-existence of entrapment.

Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,

2 L. Ed.2d 848, 78 S. Ct. 819 (1958)
When the countyfs chief criminal deputy dismissed the first prosecution
of appellant to avoid an acquittal based upon Mr. Eadyrs entrapment testimony (Tr.86-87, the State is estopped from litigating the issue again.
^•n Ash, supra, there were none of the oppressive tactical maneuvers
present in the case at bar. The prosecutor had not resorted to tactical
delays and concealment of witnesses to secure the conviction.

The State

merely treated the first trial as a "dry run for the second prosecution."
Even this approach the Supreme Court specifically forbid.
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397 U.S. 447

POINT III
PROSECUTORIAL DELAY AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO ORDER THE STATE TO PRODUCE A KEY WITNESS FOR DEFENSE DEPRIVED
APPEL1ANT OF A FAIR AND SPEEDY TRIAL.
An accused's right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his .
favor is outlined in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
of the United States and Art. I, Sec. 12 of the Constitution of Utah,
There was an eight-month delay between the incident complained of and
notice to the accused of the prosecution.

In the interim, appellant was

led to believe that the State had terminated efforts to prosecute and
appellant's key witness was allowed to leave the state.
Prior to trial appellant exhausted all avenues open to him to locate
the witness

(R.14, 34, Tr.10), and moved the court for an Order Compelling

the State to Produce the VJitness.

(Tr.3) The trial judge denied appellant's

request even though it was subsequently disclosed at trial that the witness
sought was under the court's control as part of a court-Imposed probation
and thus could be located through his probation officer. (Tr.89,90)
The extent to which appellant was prejudiced by Mr. EadyTs testimony
is demonstrated by the trial judge's verdict. The judge, in support of his
verdict, declared:
"...the court believes that the defendant stood ready, willing and able
to share with others the possession, use and division of marijuana."
(Tr.102)
This conclusion graphically illustrates the need for Mr. Eady's testimony.

Only he could advise the court why he had told Officer Call that

appellant could possibly have some marijuana or know someone who had some.
(Tr.42) Only Mr. Eady could tell the court why defendant acceeded to Mr.
Eady's demands that appellant help "his friend", Officer Call, obtain
marijuana.
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One can understand why the State did not want Mr, Eady exposing any
more police excesses but the prosecutionTs trial tactics should not have
been condoned by the trial judge. (Tr. 102)
See United States v. Currey, 384 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. 111. 1968), holding
that an abnormal delay between commission of a series of alleged drug
transactions and notice to the accused upon arrest of pending charges constitutes denial of the essentials of a fair trial and due process of law
with respect to an accused who is unable to locate a government undercover
agent without whose testimony accused!s claim of entrapment cannot be
satisfactorily resolved.

POINT IV.
APPELLANT WAS DENIED TRIAL BY JURY
At the time set for trial appellant moved the court for an order
compelling the State to produce Mr. Terrell Eady as a witness for defense.
The court was advised that appellant was unprepared to proceed without the
witness. CTr.3,6) The trial judge denied the motion and proceeded to try
the case sitting without a jury.
The State had not subpoened a jury in anticipation of appellant's
motion to compel production of the witness. The right to trial by jury is
guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of
the United States and Art. I, Sec. 12 of the Constitution of the United
States.
Under Utah law a defendant may waive trial by jury but "Such waiver
shall be made in open court and entered in the minutes." Sec. 77-27-2,
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
The clerk entered the notation "Defendant waived his right to trial
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1

by jury" in the minutes, (Tr<36) The basis for the entry remains unexplained.
There is nothing in the transcript of proceedings to support it which rebuts
any inference that a waiver was ?!made in open courtn as required by law,.
Appellant, at no time, in or out of court, knowingly waived his right to
jury trial. Accordingly this conviction must be vacated,

CONCLUSION
The assigned errors made mockery of due process. The conduct of this
trial never approached

acceptable standards for a fair trial. Appellant

prays that the judgment and sentence be reversed and set aside.

Respectfully Submitted
WILLIAM D. MARSH
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Suite 1, Estate House
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, Utah 844-01
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